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Robust PCA for Anomaly Detection in Cyber
Networks
Randy Paffenroth, Kathleen Kay, and Les Servi
Abstract—This paper uses network packet capture data
to demonstrate how Robust Principal Component Analysis
(RPCA) can be used in a new way to detect anoma-
lies which serve as cyber-network attack indicators. The
approach requires only a few parameters to be learned
using partitioned training data and shows promise of
ameliorating the need for an exhaustive set of examples
of different types of network attacks. For Lincoln Labs
DARPA intrusion detection data set, the method achieves
low false-positive rates while maintaining reasonable true-
positive rates on individual packets. In addition, the method
correctly detected packet streams in which an attack which
was not previously encountered, or trained on, appears.
Keywords: robust principal component analysis,
anomaly detection, computer networks, cyber defense
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades the dependence of society on
interconnected networks of computers has exponentially
increased, with many sectors of the world economy, such
as banking, transportation, and energy, being dependent
on network stability and security. Accordingly, maintain-
ing the integrity of computer networks is imperative, and
much research has been performed in this challenging
problem domain [18], [23], [17], [19], [20]. In this paper
we focus on a sub-topic in this important domain, namely
that of anomaly detection.
Highlights of our results include:
• We have developed a novel robust principal com-
ponent approach for anomaly detection. Instead of
classic methods where nominal background activity
(which is presumed to lay on a low-dimensional
subspace) is defined using some a priori threshold,
we instead optimize our thresholds for the current
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network of interest and assume noisy and missing
data.
• As the vast majority of our parameters are trained in
an unsupervised fashion (i.e., requiring no labeled
data), and we only have two parameters trained
on labeled data, we can make efficient use of the
limited labeled data available in many real world
cyber-anomaly detection problems.
• We demonstrate our performance on three scenarios
from the DARPA Lincoln Lab Intrusion Detection
Evaluation Data Set (https://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/
data/2000/LLS DDOS 1.0.html). The attack sce-
narios are shown in Table I. We trained on the first
two scenarios and then, on the third, we achieve
close to zero false positive rates while maintaining
reasonable true positive rates even though our algo-
rithm was provided no training information for that
attack.
Scenario 1 IP sweep from a remote site
Scenario 2 A probe of live IP addresses looking for a running
Sadmind daemon
Scenario 3 An exploitation of a Sadmind vulnerability
TABLE I: The attack scenarios in the DARPA Lincoln
Lab Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Set on which we
test our detection algorithms.
A. Background
Of course, before any progress can be made in the
detection of anomalies, one must carefully consider how
such anomalies may be defined. In particular, for the
automated detection of such anomalies to be useful
for detecting attacks in real-world cyber-data one must
consider their definition both from the computer network
perspective and the mathematical perspective.
An anomaly in a computer network can take many
forms. They include:
• extreme anomalies, such as a distributed denial of
service attack (DDoS),
• moderate anomalies, such as port scans, and
• subtle anomalies, such as a buffer overflow attack.
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However, for an anomaly to be detectable it must be the
case that it is different in some way from the normal
operations of the network. For example, if an intrusion
detection system (IDS) is installed on the network,
and it performs port scans to detect when users have
inappropriately opened ports, then a port scan is not
prima faci an anomaly for that network. One could now
imagine making a long list of rules or templates, such as
“port scans are anomalies, unless they originate from a
specified address”, and this is precisely how some IDS
systems operate. However, we are focused on the difficult
problem of detecting anomalies where no template for
the anomaly is known. Accordingly, rather than enumer-
ating possible anomalies, we focus on understanding the
normal operating modes of a computer network, and
define as anomalous any departure from this normal
operating mode.
Accordingly, our goal is to extend the body of lit-
erature which aims to detect anomalies by way of low-
dimensional representations of data measured from com-
puter networks [2], [24], [16], [17], [20]. For real-world
cyber-data, such as network packet captures (PCAP), it
has been observed that the resulting data often, under
normal conditions, resides on a low-dimensional sub-
space of the ambient, or measurement, space. A classic
approach to anomaly detection is to compute the low-
dimensional subspace on which the nominal PCAP data
resides and then detect packets that do not lay on this
low-dimensional subspace [17], [7], [29], [25]. Such
packets can be marked as anomalous.
Note, raw packets extracted from PCAP files can
sometimes be difficult to process. For example, if the
packet payloads are compressed or encrypted, then the
dimension of the subspace on which the packets reside
can be unnecessarily large. Accordingly, in our work
we pre-process the packets to extract features such as
port numbers, IP addresses, packet size, etc. We have
even added additional derived features, such as whether
a packet originated within the network or is from outside.
As we will demonstrate, representing packets using such
features gives rise to low-dimensional subspaces and
leads to good detection performance.
A classic approach to computing a low-dimensional
subspace which approximates a collection of data is
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [13], [15]. Given a
collection of points, PCA computes a linear projection of
the points to a low-dimensional subspace that minimizes
the `2 error between the original points and the projected
points.
PCA is a workhorse of many data analysis domains
including machine learning and data visualization [15],
[27], [3]. However, it is well known that the low dimen-
sional subspace provided by PCA is sensitive to outliers.
In particular, outliers will tend to pull the subspace
toward the outlier quadratically, making the distance
undesirably small between the computed subspace and
the outliers one wishes to detect. More precisely, PCA
computes a family of low-dimensional subspaces, and
the user is required to select which k-dimensional sub-
space they believe is the best representation of the
data. However, this selection is made difficult when
each subspace is computed from a mixture of nominal
and anomalous measurements. As our aim is anomaly
detection in real-world network data, a more delicate
analysis is likely required.
B. Potential of RPCA
Accordingly, herein our focus is on the growing field
of robust principal component analysis (RPCA). RPCA
has a large and active extent literature [11], [12], [10],
[23], [22], [28], and there are many algorithms that focus
on the recovery of low-dimensional subspaces from data
which has been corrupted by outliers.
In particular, much work has been performed on recov-
ery problems where theorems are proved, and numerical
demonstrations provided, along the lines of:
Assuming there exists a true low dimensional
subspace L and a true collection of anomalies
S, one recovers approximations of these values
from their sum M = L + S (or some other
similar combination of L and S) assuming L
and S satisfy some conditions [10], [28].
Such problems are quite non-trivial and have received
much attention [10], [28]. In particular, since many
combinations of L and S give rise to the same M ,
recovering a specific desired pair L, S purely from such
an M often requires delicate analysis.
However, as opposed to such recovery problems,
herein we take a novel approach and instead concern
ourselves with detection problems. Hearkening back to
the case of classic PCA, one can ask two quite different
questions:
1) Given some data (perhaps corrupted by noise) can
one recover the true low dimensional subspace that
spans the data (with the corruptions removed)?
2) Given some data can one find a low dimensional
subspace that is most effective for some other
downstream detection algorithm. I.e., how is PCA
best used as a preprocessing step for some other
machine learning algorithm?
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Both approaches are used quite widely in the PCA
literature [25] and it is questions similar to the second
question above that inspire our approach here. For exam-
ple, when using PCA as a preprocessing step for some
downstream algorithm, it is quite classic to consider
either a target dimension k for the computed subspace
or, equivalently, a desired threshold γ for the singular
values of a low-rank data matrix L. Such a threshold is
equivalent to a statement about the maximum acceptable
error between the original data points and their projec-
tion.
Accordingly, γ can either be chosen based upon some
a priori target error tolerance in the singular values or,
as we propose here, chosen based upon the cross vali-
dated detection performance of the detection algorithm.
Similarly, one can ask two different questions of RPCA.
As we will discuss in detail in the sequel, the RPCA
algorithms that we leverage herein have a parameter λ
which controls the trade-off between the low-rank matrix
L and the sparse matrix S. Mirroring the idea in the PCA
case, we ask the following question:
1) Given some data (perhaps corrupted by noise),
how should one λ that best leads to the recovery
of the true low-dimensional subspace and the true
sparse anomalies from which the observed data
was constructed?
2) Given some data, how should one find a dimension
k and a value of λ that lead to a low-dimensional
subspace and a set of anomalies that is most
effective for some other downstream detection
algorithm that only gets to train λ and not the
numerous other parameters of the algorithm? I.e.,
how is RPCA best used as a preprocessing step
for some other machine learning algorithm?
In one of the key novelties of our analysis, we demon-
strate that a cross validated choice of λ rather than
choosing λ based upon some recovery principle, can
lead to substantially improved algorithms for detecting
anomalies in computer networks. In particular, there
are no current approaches that use RPCA for detecting
anomalies in computer networks, of which we are aware,
that avail themselves of the full flexibility of RPCA. In
particular, they do not select the key parameter λ based
upon a cross validation principle.
In particular, herein we demonstrate the efficacy of our
approach on PCAP measurements from the Lincoln Labs
DARPA Intrusion Detection Data Set (https://www.ll.
mit.edu/ideval/data/2000/LLS DDOS 1.0.html), which
cover a swath of normal computer network operations
and a variety of different attack scenarios. Perhaps most
interestingly, using our methods we are able to train our
parameters such as λ on a small set of attacks, but then
we are able to use these same parameter settings to detect
different attack modalities on which the algorithm was
not trained.
In Section II we describe the mathematical foundation
of our approach, in Section III we describe the setup of
our experiments and the data set we use for validation, in
Section IV we demonstrate our results, and in Section V
we provide a summary and pointers to future work.
Finally, in the Appendix we provide additional notes on
the effecient solution of the problems of interest using
the Augmented Lagrangian Method and the Alternating
Direction Method of Multipliers.
C. Contribution and previous work
PCA is a standard algorithm in many problem domains
[15] and it has been widely applied in computer network
analysis [7] (and reference therein) with seminal work
going back to at least 2004 [18]. In addition, there are
several examples of RPCA being used in the extant
literature for computer network anomaly detection [2],
[24], [16], [17], [20] (and references therein) with a quite
recent review to be found in the 2015 Ph.D. thesis [21]
and related paper [20]. However, only the more recent
references [24], [2], [20] use the modern convex nuclear
norm approaches we leverage here.
In particular, [2] uses a RPCA on data which is similar
to our own, but they take the opposite approach to ours
when considering the coupling constant λ. They use the
theoretical value suggested in [10] and do not study
the interplay between λ and the performance of the
downstream detection algorithms.
Accordingly, a key novelty of our approach is a careful
treatment of the parameter λ which is the key element
in balancing the importance of low-dimensional L and
the anomalous S. In particular, by studying the interplay
between λ and downstream detection algorithms, the
quality of our detection results are greatly enhanced as
compared to PCA. In addition, we analyze a detection
threshold on the anomalies S, here denoted by α, which
in our experiments turns out to essentially be 1 given a
judicious choice of λ.
II. APPROACH
A. PCA
We begin the derivation of our methodology by con-
sidering a collection of points {y0, ..., yn} with yi ∈ Rm.
Each point can be thought of a collection of features that
represent a measurement of our computer network. For
example, as we will detail in Section III, herein we view
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each yi as a collection of features derived from a single
Internet packet (such as IP address, port number, etc.).
Therefore, the collection of points {y0, ..., yn} represents
some collection of packets measured across different
computers and times. Given such a collection of points
{y0, ..., yn}, the goal of PCA is to compute a linear
projection of the points {yˆ0, ..., yˆn} with each of the yˆi
laying on a specified k-dimensional subspace of Rn.1
To specify the desired k-dimensional subspace of Rn
one can encode the original points yi into a data matrix
[y0, ..., yn] = Y ∈ Rm×n (i.e., by having each yi be
a column of Y ). One can then compute the desired k-
dimensional subspace by solving the optimization prob-
lem
min
L
‖L− Y ‖2F (1)
subject to ρ(L) ≤ k
where L ∈ Rm×n, ‖L − Y ‖2F is the Frobenius norm
of L − Y (i.e., the sum of the squares of the entries of
L − Y ), and ρ(L) is the rank of L (i.e., ρ(L) is the
number of non-zero singular values of the matrix L).
A more common derivation of PCA is in terms of the
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [13] rather than
as an optimization as in (1). However, the optimization
point of view will have an important role to play in the
sequel.
In particular, given a matrix Y ∈ Rm×n, one can
always write
Y = UΣV T (2)
where U ∈ Rm×m and V ∈ Rn×n are unitary (i.e.,
UUT = I and V V T = I), and Σ is diagonal. In
addition, the diagonal entries of Σ, denoted Σii = σi
are called the singular values of Y .
In a seminal result, Eckart and Young in their 1936
paper [13] proved that the optimization problem in (1)
can be solved in closed from by setting
L = U ΣˆV T (3)
where Σˆ is computed from Σ by setting the m − k
smallest singular values σi to 0 (i.e., by retaining only
1Note, there are two equivalent meanings of the phrase “laying on
a specified k-dimensional subspace”. First, one can consider that yˆi ∈
Rm and that the m coordinates of each yˆi are linear combinations
of the k vector that span the subspace. Second, one can consider that
yˆi ∈ Rk and that the k coordinates are the position of the point on
the k dimensional subspace itself.
the k largest singular values), and L is therefore a low-
rank approximation of Y . Similarly, one can compute
a projection of Y onto the coordinate system of the k-
dimensional subspace by using the formula
X = ΣˆV T (4)
and removing the zero rows of X arising from the 0
values on the diagonal of Σˆ. An example of PCA is
shown in Figure 1. Note, the relationship between the
optimization view of PCA, as shown in (1), and the
linear algebra view, as exemplified by the SVD, will be
important in the sequel. In particular, while the SVD is
the most common implementation of PCA in current use,
it is actually the optimization version that inspires much
recent work. In particular, there are many recent results
in robust versions of PCA methods which revolve around
hearkening back to the optimization roots of PCA.
Fig. 1: In this figure we show an example of the key idea
of anomaly detection by way of PCA. Nominal data is
assumed to lay on a low-dimensional linear subspace and
anomalies are defined as any departures from this low-
dimensional subspace.
B. RPCA
PCA, while a widely used technique for dimensional-
ity reduction, is unfortunately sensitive to the presence
of outliers. In particular, as shown in Figure 2, even
when the vast majority of the measurements in Y lay
on a low-dimension subspace, the presence of just a few
outliers can substantially increase the dimension of the
subspace produced by the PCA algorithm and lead to a
reduction in our ability to later detect anomalies. Note,
this is not an issue that can be fixed by merely a judicious
choice of k. Every singular value produced by (1) can,
and likely would be, perturbed by even a single outlier.
In particular, outliers can easily transform singular values
which, for purely nominal data, would be close to 0 to
arbitrarily large values, and thereby increase the detected
dimension.
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Fig. 2: In this figure we show an example of the key idea
of the RPCA algorithm. The nominal data is corrupted by
rare events (either anomalous or not) and this data makes
the computed dimension too large. The truly nominal
data is lower dimensional than PCA reveals. I.e., even
with a large threshold for the singular values, PCA would
conclude that the data is two-dimensional. RPCA detects
these events and provides a better representation of the
low-dimensional state of the network.
Fortunately, there has been a flurry of recent attention
paid to Robust Principal Component Analysis (RPCA)
and excellent progress has been made in the literature.
We provide a very brief overview of the main ideas, and
refer the reader to [11], [10], [12], [8] for more details. In
this section we closely follow the notation and derivation
from [23], [22]
As noted in [10], the RPCA problem may seem daunt-
ing upon preliminary inspection. Given a measurement
matrix Y , we must tease apart a low rank matrix L and
a set of sparse anomalies S without knowing a priori
the true dimension k of L, nor knowing the number or
locations of the anomalous entries in S. Similar to (1),
this problem can be phrased as an optimization problem
by writing
min
L,S
ρ(L) + λ‖S‖0 (5)
subject to |Y − (L+ S)| = 0
where ρ(L) is the rank of L, ‖S‖0 is the number of
non-zero entries in S, and λ is a coupling constant which
controls the trade-off between the low-rank matrix L and
the sparse matrix S. Unfortunately, as opposed to (1),
we do not have any closed form solution to (5). Even
worse, a na¨ive, brute force approach to the problem,
where one searches over all possible combinations of
low-rank matrices L and entries of S corresponding to
a presupposed number of anomalies, would be NP-hard
in the number of anomalies.
However, Theorem 1.2 in [10], Theorem 2.1 [23], and
many similar theorems in the extent literature provide
remarkable guarantees for recovery L and S. Providing
details for these theorems would take us too far afield in
the current context, and the interested reader may refer
to extent literature for details [11], [9], [12], [10], [23],
[22]. Herein we merely observe that the optimization
in (5) is NP-hard, but a closely related problem can be
solved if some technical conditions are met.2
In particular, assuming such conditions are met, then,
with high probability the convex program
min
L,S
‖L‖∗ + λ‖S‖1 (6)
subject to |Y − (L+ S)|  
recovers L and S, where ‖L‖∗ =
∑m
i=1 σi is the nuclear
norm of L (i.e., the sum of the singular values of L) and
‖S‖1 :=
∑
ij |Sij |. λ is as in (5) and  is a set of point-
wise error constraints which we used to ameliorate the
noise found in real-world data. The reader familiar with
such algorithms will no-doubt note that ‖S‖1 is a convex
relaxation of ‖S‖0, and ‖L‖∗ is a convex relaxation of
ρ(L), and such problems can be efficiently solved [6],
[11], [10], [23], [22], [14].
Note, in (6), the importance of the parameters λ and .
In particular, Theorem 1.2 in [10] proves that setting λ =
1√
max(m,n)
, where Y ∈ Rm×n guarantees the recovery
of L and S from Y (assuming the constraints mentioned
previously).
However, in the current context, the recovery of a
presumed L and S is not our goal. In particular, as
we are attempting to detect anomalies in real-world
measured data, it is not clear what such a “true” L
and S would mean, even if we were to compute them.
Accordingly, in our work, we view λ and  as parameters
to be estimated from training data, and tuned to our
particular detection task. Of course, having λ and 
as parameters we learn from data requires us to be in
possession of appropriate training data. However, as we
will demonstrate in Section IV, it is our view that the
additional requirements for training data are well worth
the substantially better performance we achieve.
As a foreshadowing of those results, see Figure 3.
There we show the singular values of L computed from
a collection of PCAP features encoded in a measurement
matrix Y (which we will detail in the next section).
Observe how various choices of λ have a profound effect
on the dimension of the computed low-rank matrix L. As
one might imagine, the ability to choose an appropriate
2Classically, these conditions bound the rank of L, bound the
sparsity of S, require that the columns of L are incoherent far from the
standard basis, and require that the non-zero entries in S are distributed
uniformly.
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value of λ, and therefore an appropriate low-rank L, has
an equally profound effect on the ability of the algorithm
to detect anomalies.
Fig. 3: This figure shows the number of non-zero singular
values of various low-rank matrices L computed from
the same measurement matrix Y . These L-matrices are
calculated with values of λ ranging from 0.02 through
0.15, whose lines are labeled as such. The PCA line
is equivalent to sending λ to infinity. As λ increases,
the number of non-zero singular values increases to our
maximum allowed rank (40). λ = 0.15 has 40 non-
zero singular values (and does not reach our iteration
threshold (1000)). The SVD of Y has 94 singular values
but the latter 55 are the same. In calculation, we will
be treating this as 49 non-zero singular values. As for
λ = 0.02, 0.035, 0.05, 0.075, and 0.10, we have 8,
18, 24, 32, and 38 non-zero singular values, respectively.
Larger values of λ makes placing anomalies into S more
expensive, and generally increase the rank. On the other
hand, smaller values of λ makes placing anomalies into S
less expensive. Interestingly, the relation between λ and
the number of non-zero singular values is not necessarily
linear.
III. PROBLEM SETUP AND FEATURE SELECTION
A. Problem setup
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
techniques we make use of PCAP measurements
from the Lincoln Labs DARPA Intrusion Detection
Data Set (https://www.ll.mit.edu/ideval/data/2000/LLS
DDOS 1.0.html). This data set cover a swath of normal
computer network operations and a variety of different
attack scenarios including
• IP sweeps,
• probing and breaking in through the Sadmind dae-
mon, and
• the preparation and execution of a Distributed De-
nial of Service (DDoS) attack.
We chose to use the PCAP data in our experiments
since it represents the most fundamental measurement
for network problems. However, in future work, there
are many other paths that we could consider, such as
stream based measurements.
As a preprocessing step we leveraged Wireshark [5],
[4], [26] to convert the original PCAP files into comma
separated value (CSV) files, and we then performed the
bulk of the processing using the Python [1] scripting
language. The raw CSV files from Wireshark include
the following features directly extracted from the PCAP
files: Source IP address, Destination IP address, Source
Port, Destination Port, Protocol, packet length, and the
packet time.
From this raw PCAP data we have chosen to create a
number of higher level features derived from this base
feature set. Perhaps most importantly, we one-hot encode
[15] our non-numerical values, such as IP addresses,
to create numerical values appropriate for analysis. For
example, for each unique IP address that appears as a
source IP address in a packet header, we create a row
of Y which is 1 if that packet in from that IP address,
and is 0 otherwise. Similarly, while a port number is an
integer, port numbers do not have the same semantics
as integers (e.g., port numbers 79, the Finger protocol,
and 80, the HTTP protocol, are not really that close to
each other in functionality). Accordingly, we have rows
of Y corresponding to several ports that we consider to
be important, encoded using the same 0 or 1 scheme.
In summary, our higher level features are shown in
Table II
27 0-1 features unique source IP addresses
27 0-1 features unique destination IP addresses
13 0-1 features important system ports on the source side
13 0-1 features important system ports on the destination
side
2 0-1 features distinguish ports below 1024 from those
above 1024 on the source side
2 0-1 features distinguish ports below 1024 from those
above 1024 on the destination side
1 0-1 feature designate missing port number on the
source side
1 0-1 feature designate missing port number on the des-
tination side
7 0-1 feature various protocols (ICMP, sadmind,
Portmap, TELNET, TCP, FTP, and HTTP)
1 numerical feature number of bytes in the packet
TABLE II: The features that we derive from PCAP data.
This gives a Y matrix with a total of 94 rows, 54
for IP addresses, 32 for ports, 7 for protocols, and 1 for
packet length.
With the above features in mind, we extract from the
6
full Lincoln Lab dataset a subset comprised of 8322
packets. We then have a data matrix Y ∈ Rm×n where
m = 94 and n = 8322. In particular, as shown in
Figure 4, our data can be viewed as a set of three attack
stages, with a large region of nominal data proceeding
the first attack stage, and smaller regions of nominal data
between each of the following attack stages. The attack
stages are shown in Table I. However, it is important
to emphasize that even the areas of the data where the
attacks are occurring, the attack packets are quite sparse
and interspersed/masked by a substantial percentage of
normal data. A cartoon of the set-up of Y can be found
in Figure 4.
Fig. 4: This figure shows our experimental setup. Nominal
packets (shown in blue) are interspersed with nominal,
but rare, events (shown in purple) and the three attack
scenarios, from Table I (shown in red).
B. Decision algorithm
With the details from Sections III-A in mind, we can
now precisely state our method for detecting anomalies
in the Lincoln Labs DARPA Intrusion Detection Data
Set. The training of our algorithm can be best explained
by referring to Figure 4. In particular, we take the data
before the stage one attack in Figure 4 and denote it by
Y0. We then use Y0 to compute a nominal L0 and S0
using (5) and (6).3 In particular, there are rare, but not
anomalous events even before the stage one attack that
appear in Y0. Accordingly, the S0 matrix is certainly not
empty, even before the first attack occurs. The nominal
L0 matrix is, we believe, a more accurate representation
of the true nominal processing of the network.
In effect, our goal is to identify points which are at
distance greater than a threshold α from the subspace
spanned by L0 (where distance is measured using the
‖ · ‖∞ norm). Accordingly, given a training Y0 as
3Note, while this process might appear superficially similar to what
one might do in a standard PCA analysis, it is actually quite different
in spirit and in practice
constructed in Section III-A, and appropriate parameters
λ and α (whose selection we will detail in Section III-C),
we can run the RPCA procedure in (6) to produce a
nominal S0 and L0. We then extract a data matrix Ya that
overlaps one of the attack stages, but does not necessarily
overlap Y0, and project Ya onto the subspace spanned by
L0 to compute La. This can be thought of as extracting
the nominal part of Ya. We can compute the anomalies
for Ya by simply setting Sa = Ya−La. With Sa in hand,
our detection scheme is quite simple. We will merely flag
as anomalous any columns in Sa (which is equivalent to
flagging a particular packet), whose maximum entry is
larger than some threshold α. In other words, we flag as
anomalous any packet whose corresponding column of
Si ∈ S has ‖Si‖∞ = maxj |Sij | > α.
C. λ and α training
The selection of our values for λ and α can again be
best explained by referring to Figure 4. In particular, as
before, we chose to compute our nominal L0 and S0 on
Y0.
Using our notation from Section II, our first stage of
training is to compute a sequence of L0 and S0 matrices
as we vary λ, with small λ values leading to lower
dimensional L0 matrices and higher values of λ leading
to higher dimensional L0 matrices. We then select the
value of λ that leads to the best detection performance
on the stage one and stage two attacks. However, the
λ value we use does not use any training data from
the stage three attacks. We then chose α by fixing λ
(and thereby fixing L0 and S0) and selecting which
α value gives the best detection performance over the
same two stages, again not using any data from the
quite different stage three attack. The stage three attack
remains pristine, allowing for a true cross validation
experiment which would be similar to how the algorithm
would be used in the field.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we show a variety of results arising
from our analysis. In particular, we demonstrate that
a RPCA method, with a λ value optimized for attack
detection can provide superior results to both a standard
PCA analysis and a RPCA analysis that uses a λ value
based upon some matrix recovery principal.
We begin with Figure 5, where we show a standard
PCA analysis. As can be seen, the PCA analysis misses
the vast majority of attack packets in all three attack
stages. PCA is able to detect a few attack packets, but
only at the cost of numerous false negatives. We conjec-
ture, as demonstrated in Figure 3, that the dimension
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of the subspace generated by PCA is too large, and
therefore many packets which are in fact anomalous
actually end up laying close to the normal subspace L
generated by the training data Y0. It is important to note
that, as already discussed in Section II-A, that the dimen-
sion k in the standard PCA algorithm can be selected
to make the dimension of L arbitrarily large or small.
However, by the very nature of the optimization (1),
the PCA algorithm forces the detected anomalies to be
small numbers, and thereby substantially complicates the
decision algorithm in Section III-B. It is an interesting
path for future research to compare decision algorithms
customized to different dimension reduction procedures.
Fig. 5: Here we show detection results for our three attack
stages and detected using a PCA based algorithm for gen-
erating a low-dimensional subspace from our training data
Y0 and the detection scheme discussed in Section III-B.
The red lines represent the detection threshold, the blue
lines show the detected anomalies (which raise an alarm
when the blue line is above the red detection threshold),
and black dotted lines which mark the true attacks. As you
can see, the PCA algorithm misses most of the attacks in
stage one and two, as well as many of the attack packets
in the later parts of stage three.
Next, in Figure 6, we show a RPCA analysis using
a nominal λ = 1√
max(m,n)
= 0.01096, as suggested
in [10] for balancing L and S. Such a value for λ is
classically chosen based up a recovery principle for L
and S. As opposed to the PCA analysis which has a
large false negative rate, the RPCA analysis with the
nominal λ value has a large false positive rate. Again,
as was foreshadowed in Figure 3, the dimension of the
space computed by RPCA from the training data Y0 is
much too small. The small nominal λ leads to too many
measurements being placed into the sparse matrix S and
therefore too many detected anomalies.
Fig. 6: Here we show detection results for our three attack
stages and detected using a RPCA based algorithm with
a nominal λ value as suggested in [10]. As in Figure 5,
the red lines represent the detection threshold, the blue
lines show the detected anomalies (which raise an alarm
when the blue line is above the red detection threshold),
and black dotted lines which mark the true attacks. As
you can see, the RPCA algorithm with a nominal λ
value flags many normal packets as anomalous since the
subspace it computed from the training data Y0 is too
low-dimensional.
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Most importantly, in Figure 7, we show a RPCA
analysis using a λ = 0.157 which is approximately
15 times larger than the nominal λ = 0.01096 as in
[10]. Of course, nothing in this text should be viewed
as contradicting the results in [10]. However, we are
solving a different problem. We are not focused on
recovering a true low-rank L and sparse S. In particular,
it is not even clear what such a “true” low-rank L and
sparse S would even mean in our case. Rather, we choose
λ to optimize our anomaly detection performance. In
some sense, the L we compute from our training data
Y0 is most appropriate for the computer network at
hand and therefore our anomaly detection performance
is improved.
Finally, as observed in Section III-B we also need to
train our anomaly detection threshold α. Accordingly, in
Figure 8 we show Receiver Operator Curves (ROC) for
each of the stages as we vary the detection threshold
α from 0 to 1. We show ROC curves for PCA, for
RPCA using a nominal λ = 0.01096, and for RPCA
using an optimized λ = 0.157. Again, the optimized
λ was chosen by training on the attacks in stage one
and two, and therefore the good performance may not
be surprising in that case. However, the results in stage
three are not tuned for those specific attacks, and the
optimized λ still provides better performance in those
cases across all threshold values α.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have demonstrated how a RPCA
approach can be used to detect anomalies in PCAP data.
In particular, we have shown that using training data to
optimize just two parameters in the RPCA algorithm, can
lead to substantially improved detection results in con-
trast to a PCA approach or a RPCA approach using the
literature-recommended value for λ. We illustrated by
example that one class of attacks could quite successfully
detect a separate class of attacks. This result supports our
original hypothesis that the low dimensional subspace
computed by RPCA, even on training data, is more
representative of the true nominal state of the measured
data. This allows for a great range of anomalies, and
hence network attacks, to be successfully detected.
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